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Abstract—Attack-awareness recognizes self-awareness for se-
curity systems regarding the occurring attacks. More frequent
and intense attacks on cloud and network infrastructures are
pushing security systems to the limit. With the end of Moore’s
Law, merely scaling against these attacks is no longer eco-
nomically justified. Previous works have already dealt with the
adoption of Software-defined Networking and Network Function
Virtualization in security systems and used both approaches to
optimize performance by the intelligent placement of security
functions. However, these works have not yet considered the
sequence in which traffic passes through these functions. In this
work, we make a case for the need to take this ordering into
account by showing its impact. We then propose a reordering
framework and analyze what aspects are necessary for modeling
security service function chains and making decisions regarding
the order based on those models. We show the impact of the
order and validate our framework in an evaluation environment.
The effect can extend to multiple orders of magnitude, and the
framework’s evaluation proves the feasibility of our concept.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s network attacks rely on massive bot networks. Their
attacking power rises as the number of online devices rapidly
grows in times of Internet of Things (IoT). The ending of
Moore’s Law (promising doubled resources every two years)
limits the opportunity to throw in additional resources to fight
attacks. Moreover, booking additional resources on demand
is very costly, especially considering that the owners of bot
networks do not have to pay for their attack resources.
IT systems providing services via a network offer various
attack vectors. For each type of network attack, there are
dedicated security functions to defend the system. Multiple
security functions together form Security Service Function
Chains (SSFCs) to protect a system against a set of attack
types. For most systems, there is a direct correlation between
consumed resources and the number of processed packages. In
contrast, security functions (and therefore SSFCs) stand out,
as they drop packets deemed as malicious causing lower load
on subsequent security functions.
Figure 1 shows an SSFC with three different security func-
tions. In most current security architectures, those SSFCs are
Fig. 1: An example for a Security Service Function Chain.
hard-wired or interconnected using a fixed order via Software-
defined Networking (SDN).
If the setup is under standard load without an attack occur-
ring, the SSFC order is not relevant. All packets are benign
and, therefore, have to pass through all security functions in
the SSFC. Reordering the functions would not change the
resource demand generated by the benign packets.
This changes when an attack occurs, that matches one of
the security function. With the initial configuration, the traffic
passes through all security functions in the SSFC. Thus, it
creates resource demand at every step until the last security
function stops it. When we put the blue security function at the
front of the SSFC, this order leads to the first security function
dropping the malicious traffic immediately. Thus, traffic does
not pass on to the white and red security functions and creates
only resource demands at the blue security function. Table I
shows an example scenario which proves that optimal config-
urations can reduce the total number of required instances.
Related work mainly deals with Network Function Virtu-
alization (NFV) as an enabler for security functions covered
SDN either a security risk or feature. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no other works went into analyzing the performance
impact of SSFC orders or presented solutions and models for
SSFC reordering.
This work introduces the following contributions:
• An analysis of the performance impact of different in-
dividual security functions and of security functions in
SSFCs with different orders.
• A design, proof-of-concept (PoC) implementation, and
evaluation of a framework for dynamic SSFC reordering.
SSFC number of instances
Ordering red white blue total
red – white – blue 10 5 7 22
red – blue – white 10 7 1 18
white – red – blue 5 10 7 22
white – blue – red 5 7 1 13
blue – red – white 7 1 1 9
blue – white – red 7 1 1 9
TABLE I: Example calculation of the resource demand for
different SSFC orders of the example SSFC. Throughput per
instance: red 100 MBit/s, blue 150 MBit/s, white 200 MBits/s.
Load profile: 950 MBit/s malicious traffic matching the blue
security function and 50 MBit/s of benign traffic.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
08
36
4v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 17
 M
ay
 20
20
• Modeling formalisms for the traffic inside the network,
single security functions and SSFCs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First,
Section II and Section III present the required background
and related works. We analyze security function and SSFC
performance in Section IV and present our SSFC reordering
framework in Section V. Section VI introduces modeling
approaches for individual security functions and SSFCs, and
Section VII provides our conclusion and future work.
II. FOUNDATIONS
For our approach, we use various security functions. Also,
SDN and NFV are important underlying technologies.
A. Security Appliances
We use multiple security functions in this work. We mainly
focus on DPSs, IDPSes, and firewalls.
1) Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Protection Sys-
tems: One of the most popular mechanism to mitigate DDoS
attacks is SYN Cookies. It is readily available for services run-
ning on top of mainline Linux kernel, and therefore is widely
adopted. A SYN flooding attack exploits the limited size of the
TCP buffer which is a critical resource for establishing new
connections. SYN cookies are a Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) standard compliant way of eliminating the need for
buffer entries related to half-open connections. Generally, the
data stored in the buffer is necessary to check if a received
ACK packet belongs to previous SYN and SYN+ACK packets
and whether the client received the server’s initial sequence
number correctly. The idea of SYN cookies is to not store this
information locally, but to encode it into the sent SYN+ACK
packet and to retrieve this information from the ACK response.
2) Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPSes):
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPSes) combine
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSes) and Intrusion Preven-
tion Systems (IPSes). IDSes can detect attacks and provide
additional defense mechanisms, whereas, IPSes are capable
of actively defending against incoming attacks. IDPSes can
be classified based on the type of Monitored Platform, At-
tack Detection Methods used, Monitoring Method and De-
ployment Architecture. In this work, we focus on network-
based, misused-based, real-time and non-distributed IDPSes.
A network-based IDPSes is placed strategically on the network
to detect any attacks that originate from outside the network.
Misuse-based IDPSes primarily target singular attacks that
usually are carried out in a single step [1] to exploit a selected
vulnerability. Here, an IDPSes uses signatures containing the
features of the exploit for its detection. Real-time IDPSes
intercept the packets before they reach the target system and
work synchronously to the traffic flow. Non-distributed IDPSes
are deployed at a singular (central) position inside the network.
3) Firewalls: Firewalls can be defined [2] as an interme-
diate system that is plugged between the network and the
Internet to establish a controlled link, and to erect an outer
security wall or perimeter. The aim of this perimeter is to
protect the network from network-based threats and attacks,
and to provide a single choke point where security and audit
can be imposed. Most common firewalls work on the third
layer of the OSI-Stack, also known as the network layer. These
firewalls filter the incoming packets based on a pre-defined
set of rules and check whether a packet matches against these
rules or not. The rules rely on the information available in
the packet headers such as protocol numbers, source and
destination IP addresses. Another type of firewall is the so-
called proxy servers (e.g., SYNPROXY). These servers require
authentication before the individual services can be accessed.
If the authentication is successful, the proxy forwards packets
between the server and the client.
B. Software-defined Networking (SDN)
SDN takes on the challenges posed by the increasing
number of participants in the network and the associated
exponential rise in cost due to the directly correlated growth
in resource demands. The objective of SDN was to achieve
greater scalability, flexibility, automation, and independence
from hardware manufacturers to reduce acquisition and oper-
ating costs. SDN relies on four basic principles:
The separation of control and data planes divides the
switching process into the control plane, using routing algo-
rithms to decide on packet forwarding, with the data plane,
technically handling the packet. SDN allows influencing the
forwarding process externally to communicate with the switch
allowing the switch to change its behavior at runtime without
having to replace the hardware components.
The central control instance, called the controller, enables
the configuration and administration of the network. For
reasons of availability or load distribution, it can be deployed
as a physical or virtual replica.
The behavior of a switch can be changed using software,
enabling the installation from algorithms or other applications
from different manufacturers - independent of the hardware
producer. This feature also allows applications to operate
above the network layer, i.e., at the application level, regardless
of the switch model or the OS.
SDN brings together areas that are traditional handled sep-
arately via four essential APIs. The Southbound API connects
the control and data layer. OpenFlow is the most popular
open protocol for the Southbound API in SDNs. OpenFlow
(OF) can be used to configure and evaluate the statistics of a
network device, usually a switch. The Westbound API is used
to communicate different control layers of different domains.
The Northbound API exchanges information between the
application and control layers. The Eastbound API provides
a contact surface for non-SDN components.
C. Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
NFV is a new paradigm for networks. Typically deployed
on proprietary specialized hardware in the past, these functions
are replaceable by software solutions running on commodity
hardware [3], [4]. Typical examples of such functions are
switching, routing, load balancing, and firewalls. The imple-
mentation of a function usually is referenced as a Virtualized
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Network Function (VNF) as it is commonly deployed inside
a Virtual Machine (VM) to allow for higher flexibility and
scalability. Not every function is suitable for conversion into
a VNF. The use of multiple resources having optimized
processors or FPGAs still can be advantageous for real-time
requirements. VNFs depend on performance in several ways.
First, the network adapters limit the number and the speed
of available ports. Second, the I/O subsystem between the
network card and the application can affect the performance.
Also, the resources provided for the application (such as
memory, and Central Processing Unit (CPU)) can become
a bottleneck. Many NFV solutions are implemented usually
in conjunction with specialized Operating Systems (OSs) or
drivers to minimize bottlenecks. Mapping the network func-
tions in the software separates the data and control layers, one
of the central goals of SDN.
III. RELATED WORK
We provide a compressed overview of works regarding
SDN for security and security for SDN. We further present
works on NFV deployment, application, and the whitepaper
that motivated our research.
SDN creates “a very fascinating dilemma” [5] — it offers
a wide range of benefits for security implementation while in-
troducing new security challenges. The research demonstrated
that different attacks can affect not only the functioning of the
targeted component but also the availability and confidentiality
of each layer and interface of the SDN stack. Scott-Hayward et
al. [6] presented a detailed analysis of these security challenges
and categorized them by the affected SDN layer/interface.
In addition to traditional Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks,
the intelligence centralization and vertical split into three main
functional layers that expand the attack surface and inspire new
techniques for each layer. An Application Layer DoS Attack
directly targets an application to consume all of the resources
allocated to it and to cause a DoS. A Control Layer DoS
Attack can arise by targeting any of its components, (e.g.,
forcing different applications to generate many conflicting
flow rules may lead a controller to an unpredictable state). In
Infrastructure Layer DoS Attacks, bottlenecks in OF switches
and the southbound Application Programming Interface (API)
are exploited. Moreover, generating fake flows fills the flow
tables and prevents rules for normal network flows to be
stored [7].
SDN provides opportunities to revisit old security concepts
and to introduce new techniques as SDN features [5] to
enhance network resilience. Network-wide knowledge facil-
itates the validation of security policies and enables quick
identification and resolution of any conflicts [8]. As a result,
consistent security policies can be built and maintained. In
addition, SDN supports software-based traffic analysis that
opens the door for innovative ideas, and Chi et al. [9] present
different concepts on how to integrate the Snort IDS into an
SDN-based network.
Barbette et al. [10], as well as Gallemnueller et al. [11],
provide a detailed comparison of various NFV development
kits and frameworks, including the recently proposed XDP
framework [12]. In the context of the performance evaluation
of software-implemented network functions, [3] provides an
extensive list of best practices and caveats. A detailed network
security investigation related to the use cases of SDN and NFV
is presented in the survey by Lorenz et al. [13], and Farris
et al. provide an extensive overview of emerging SDN and
NFV security mechanisms in the context of the Internet of
Things [14].
In addition to introducing the possibilities for dynamic
SSFC, SDN also allows augmenting them with traffic and
application awareness [15]. Many solutions rely on SDN
and NFV in the context of DDoS resiliency. Multiple open
topics are discussed by various authors that include 1) rule
anomalies [16], 2) intelligent positioning [17], and 3) effective
provisioning [18].
Security Function Chaining (SFCing) is a significant com-
ponent of this work and essential for complex NFV security
frameworks. The first inspiration for this work was the Cloud
Security Alliance (CSA) “Security Position Paper: Network
Function Virtualization” paper by Milenkoski et al. [19]
that proposes six NFV security challenges: 1) Hypervisor
dependencies, 2) Elastic network boundaries, 3) Dynamic
workloads, 4) Service insertion, 5) Stateful versus stateless
inspection, and 6) Scalability of available resources. The
authors detail an enterprise-grade architecture for a NFV
security framework that reduces deployment and management
resources as well as adapt the SSFC ordering of its security ap-
pliances depending on an incoming attack. This work inspired
our efforts.
IV. IMPACT OF SECURITY FUNCTION CHAIN ORDERING
We claim that that the SSFC order of security functions
influences the performance of the SSFC. In this section, we
will evaluate security functions and SSFCs with different
orders to assert our claim. At first, we present the used
evaluation environment. We then measure the performance of
three different security functions in a stand-alone deployment.
The measured security functions are a firewall, a DPS, and
an IDPS. Then, we put these security functions in SSFCs
with two service functions and vary their order. Last, we
discuss the results and the conclusions that we must consider
for the reordering framework and the decision-making in the
following sections.
A. Evaluation Environment
To evaluate security function performance, we designed a
testbed (Figure 2) that can incorporate benign and malicious
workloads using single functions and composite SSFCs with
modifiable function order and different server applications.
1) Hardware Components: We use a total of six physical
servers. These play the roles of 1) a client and attacker,
2) an application server (the protected application), 3) a
DDoS Protection System (DPS), 4) a firewall, 5) an Intrusion
Detection and Prevention System (IDPS), and 6) an SDN,
Experiment and Function Chaining Controller. For all servers,
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Fig. 2: Evaluation setup for different security functions and
SSFC orders.
we use a four-core (8 threads) Intel Xeon E3-1230 V2 CPU at
3.30 GHz equipped with 16 GB RAM. The client & attacker
machine is serving two roles and, therefore, also uses one link
for each role. Two standard non-programmable 1 GBit/s HPE
switches provide the connectivity for the backend and con-
troller network and HPE 5130 24G 4SFP+ EI SDN switches
span the network for the experimentation data. The switches
provide sufficient backplane switching capacity to ensure that
this setup does not become a bottleneck.
2) Software Components: a) Traffic Generator (benign):
On the first 10 GBit/s interface of the client & attacker server,
we generate benign Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traf-
fic. For this purpose, we use HTTP Load Generator [20].
b) Traffic Generator (malicious): We use the second 10 GBit/s
interface of the client & attacker server to create malicious
packets. We create SYN, User Datagram Protocol (UDP),
and IDS floods using Cisco’s Trex generator. For the chosen
attacks, we use only the stateless mode. To generate HTTP
floods, we employ BoNeSi — a BotNet Simulator. c) IDPS:
The IDPS host runs the Snort IDPS in version 2.9.7. Snort is a
popular, open-source IDPS developed by Cisco and also is the
foundation of Cisco’s commercial IDPS solutions. d) Firewall:
Like the IDPS, the Firewall uses one interface for incoming
and one for outgoing traffic. We interconnect both interfaces
using a Linux bridge, and Netfilter/iptables rules accomplish
the packet filtering. e) DPS: As a DPS, we use a modified ver-
sion of TCP Handshake Remote Establishment and Dynamic
Rerouting using SDN (THREADS) [21]. THREADS is a DPS
VNF against SYN flood attacks. It handles SYN requests
and only for successful requests establishes a connection with
the server and triggers an SDN reconfiguration. Thereby,
it eliminates many shortcomings of SYNPROXY and SYN
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Fig. 3: Performance (in successful requests over 90 seconds)
for the Direct Chain and single intermediary security functions.
cookies. f ) Protected Service: The target server runs TeaStore,
a micro-service reference and test application emulating a
basic online store [22]. g) SDN Controller: We use Ryu as
the SDN controller. The ryu.app.ofctl_rest module
provides a REST-based interface for deploying flows.
3) Monitoring and Metrics Collection: The testbed mea-
sures and records the following metrics from various sources:
a) the CPU usage of each server in various states: user,
iowait, softirq, system, b) the total number of sent and
successful benign HTTP requests, and c) the average Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and TCP SYN latency and
packet loss between sender and receiver. Telegraf collects
CPU usage statistics and sends them to an InfluxDB running
on the experiment controller. We use Grafana to visualize
the gathered data. The HTTP traffic generator reports the
number of total and successful requests during the run. The
ping command allows measuring the latency and packet loss
between the sender and receiver. We measure the SYN latency
and packet loss using hping3. For ICMP and SYN latency and
packet loss, we run an attack of intensity x for a time t and
ping and establish TCP connections during that time.
B. Single Security Function Performance
Before evaluating the impact of the SSFC order on perfor-
mance, it is necessary to establish a baseline that establishes
a realistic maximum performance that is attainable by the
service host. Figure 3 visualizes that the service scales linearly
and beginning with 16000 requests/second the number of
successful requests stalls. There is even a small decrease
in throughput afterward which is probably attributable to
queuing, swapping, and context switching effects. At that
point, for the Direct Chain (both servers directly connected
to the same switch), the target service has reached its limit.
The first data row in Table IIa shows very low latency and no
packet loss. These results serve as a baseline for evaluating
how the appliances impact the latency and data loss.
We repeat the same experiment with each single security
function present and Figure 3 shows that the security functions
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Chain Average ICMP Average SYN
response packet loss response packet loss
Direct 0.191ms 0% 4.5ms 0%
Firewall 0.343ms 0% 3.8ms 0%
DPS 0.194ms 0% 4.7ms 0%
IDPS 0.340ms 0% 4.4ms 0%
(a) Single security functions with a benign workload.
Chain Average ICMP Average SYN
response packet loss response packet loss
Firewall→IDPS 0.390ms 0%
IDPS→Firewall 0.403ms 0%
(b) HTTP flood with firewall and IDPS.
Chain Average ICMP Average SYN
response packet loss response packet loss
DPS→Firewall 0.288ms 0% 1.0ms 0%
Firewall→DPS 0.242ms 0% 4.5ms 0%
(c) SYN flood with DPS and firewall.
Chain Average ICMP Average SYN
response packet loss response packet loss
IDPS→Firewall 36.0ms 30% 37.0ms 34%
Firewall→IDPS 16.0ms 0% 17.9ms 0%
(d) Intrusion flood with IDPS and firewall.
TABLE II: Latencies and packet losses for various configura-
tions.
behave differently. The firewall closely follows the results from
the Direct Chain. The DPS and the IDPS both can follow
only the direct connection up to 3000 requests/second and
then stagnate or even lose performance.
When asserting the further metrics from Table IIa, we
realize, that the firewall and the IDPS increase the ICMP
response. These results and further experiments lead us to the
assumption that this effect roots in the number of necessary
switches the packets must travel through. Here, the DPS
connects via a single extra switch, while the firewall and the
IDPS connect to switches further up in the chain, creating
additional hops. For the SYN response the sole outlier is the
firewall, that reduces this time. No configuration creates packet
loss for either ICMP or SYN packets.
C. Security Service Function Chain Performance
After evaluating the single security functions, we now
proceed to combinations of security functions. We create
simulated attacks and combine pairs of security functions for
each attack and switch their ordering for comparison.
1) HTTP Flood: The first benchmark is an HTTP flood
attack. This attack aims to exhaust a services resources by
issuing HTTP requests either in high frequency or by targeted
requests creating a high compute load. The firewall is the
defending security function and blocks HTTP requests from
the malicious sources. We scale the HTTP flood attack in
steps of 1000 requests/second up to 14000 requests/second and
perform 2000 benign HTTP requests/second for one minute
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Fig. 4: Successful requests during an HTTP flood attack.
to assert the performance for benign workloads. We measure
metrics – other than the throughput – at 5000 requests/second
flood strength. We compare the following two SSFC orders:
a) IDPS→Firewall, and b) Firewall → IDPS.
Figure 4 presents the throughput results. Both systems
handle the benign workload and a small attack load of 1000
requests/second well. At higher attack load levels, the number
of successful benign requests drops for the IDPS→Firewall
SSFC and from 10000 requests onwards settles just above
20000 successful requests. Meanwhile, the Firewall→IDPS
SSFC is hardly affected by the attack load and remains close
to the maximum attainable level and always stays significantly
above the other SSFC order’s level.
Table IIb shows further metrics for the two SSFC orders.
Considering these values, both SSFC orders perform similarly.
When considering the CPU load measurements (not shown),
we see that the IDPS is at maximum load for both SSFC
orders. However, when the firewall is not in front, at the
beginning, a clear overload is visible. The firewall resides at
very low load levels and shows to have significant reserves.
2) SYN Flood: As a second benchmark, we perform a SYN
Flood attack. This attack aims at exhausting a server’s buffer
for half-open TCP connections. The DPS is the defending
security function. For each run, we increase the SYN flood
strength by 500 Mbit/s, up to 6500 Mbit/s. We generate a
load of 2000 benign HTTP requests/second for one minute to
evaluate the successful requests during a SYN flood. We mea-
sure metrics other than the successful requests at 5000 MBit/s
attack load. For this attack, we benchmark two more SSFC
orders: a) DPS→Firewall, and b) Firewall → DPS.
Figure 5 presents the number of successful requests for
both SSFC orders, which keep an optimal success rate until
2000 MBit/s. After that, the firewall-headed SSFC order
slowly drops. There is a very steep drop at 3500 MBit/s. At
6000 MBit/s, it further drops to 3688, and then stays at a
similar level. The DPS→Firewall SSFC continues at maximum
performance until 3000 MBit/s. Then, it continuously drops
but stays significantly above the inverse chain’s performance.
Table IIc shows further metrics for both SSFC orders. The
results are a little more diverse than for the previous attack
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Fig. 6: Successful requests during an intrusion flood attack.
and combinations. The Firewall→DPS SSFC offers a faster
ICMP response while the DPS→Firewall SSFC yields a faster
SYN response. The relative difference for the SYN response
is larger than for the ICMP response. Both configurations do
not yield packet losses.
The Firewall→DPS SSFC impacts the load during the
attack. The background load (e.g., OS operations or filesystem
journaling) in the user and system state is forced out by the
actual load of the firewall application. This application load
appears in the softirq level, where the CPU spends 100%
of its time. When reversing the SSFC order, no noticeable
load shows in the softirq state, and the background loads
remain in the user and system state. Thus, this SSFC order
eliminates all load on the firewall.
3) Intrusion Flood: The intrusion flood attack aims at
abusing vulnerabilities inside a service. We use UDP packets
containing a signature that matches the IDPS rules to create the
flood and perform the intrusion flood for up to 5000 MBit/s
scaling in steps of 500 MBit/s. Further, we measure further
metrics at an attack load of 1000 MBit/s and compare the
same SSFC orders as for the HTTP flood.
Figure 6 shows the number of successful requests for both
SSFC orders. Already at a flood strength of 500 MBit/s the
Firewall→IDPS chain drops to 31732 successful requests. At
1000 MBit/s flood strength this chain further drops to 7238
successful requests and from thereon stays at similar or lower
levels. The reverse chain’s performance drops later, starting at
1000 MBit/s with a drop to 43442 MBit/s. It then continues to
slowly fall and finally aligns with the firewall-headed chains
throughput at 4000 MBit/s. Between the beginning of attacks
at 500 MBit/s and the alignment, the IDPS→Firewall SSFC
outperforms the other chain.
The IDPS→Firewall SSFC about doubles the response time
compared to its counterpart (see Table IId. It also introduces
a packet loss rate of about one third of packets. This result
surprises, since the higher throughput of the IDPS-headed
chain did not hint at this behavior. However, a way of getting
higher throughput might lie in accepting packet losses. Putting
the firewall first creates user and system load for both
systems. While the firewall is not in an extremely high load
situation, the IDPS is in overload. Changing the SSFC order
results in taking away the load from the firewall and the
system load from the IDPS but heavily overloads the IDPS.
The firewall spends most of its time the softirq state, when
it is first in the chain. However, when the IDPS heads the
chain, only a small peak appears at the beginning.
D. Discussion
Section IV-B shows that even under benign workloads,
the different security functions perform with significant dif-
ferences. While the firewall can protect a service without
reducing the throughput, the DPS and the IDPS reach their
limits far before the protected service. Also, both systems (the
IDPS more than the DPS) show that their performance can
further drop when the load increases further.
Section IV-C confirms our assumption that the SSFC order
has a significant impact on SSFC performance. When consid-
ering the throughput, we see different behaviors when compar-
ing different attacks. Those behaviors share one commonality
– placing the security function that defends against the attack
first yields the most successful benign requests. In some cases,
the right SSFC order significantly prolongs the load level at
which performance drops and slows the drop. Still, at some
point, both SSFC orders converge to similar results.
We show that the SSFC order has a significant effect on the
throughput, other metrics and the CPU load. For the selected
attack combinations, we also find that there is no optimal
SSFC order for all attacks. While for HTTP flood, the firewall
performs best before the IDPS, the reversed chain is superior
during an intrusion flood. In general, putting the security
function dedicated to protecting against the current attack first,
yields the best results. Therefore, we require different SSFC
orders depending on the current attack state of the system.
This finding confirms our claim that dynamic SSFC reordering
can improve the performance of SSFCs. We will follow the
realization of this concept in the following sections.
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V. A FRAMEWORK FOR ATTACK-AWARE SECURITY
FUNCTION CHAIN REORDERING
In this section, we will present an architecture for an attack-
aware dynamic SSFC reordering framework and provide a PoC
implementation. We then evaluate this implementation and its
capabilities and discuss the results and further challenges.
A. Architecture
The attack-aware SSFC reordering framework consists of
multiple components, as depicted in Figure 7. A generic
SDN-enabled network connects the external network and the
service protected by our security system. All relevant security
functions connect to that network as well. We deploy so-called
security function wrappers alongside the security functions to
gather metrics about them and their attack and report them
to the Function Chaining Controller (FCC). The FCC collects
data from the wrappers and optionally other sources. It forms a
decision whether an SSFC reordering is necessary and in that
case sends the new SSFC order to the SDN controller which
enforces the new order inside the SDN-enabled network.
The Security Function Wrapper is a program running on
the security function hosts and communicates with the FCC.
It is responsible for registering the security function at the
FCC, deleting it on graceful shutdowns, keeping a connection
to the FCC to allow the management of security functions
through the FCC, and finally, offering an interface for the
security function to report detected attacks to the FCC over
the wrapper. At first, the security function wrapper validates
and loads its configuration. If everything is loaded correctly,
it registers with the FCC and receives a token for further
communication. In a keep-alive loop, the security function
wrapper periodically sends a keep-alive message to the FCC
and receives an updated token. In its main loop, it reports
attacks registered by the monitored security function after
performing a validation (e.g., a machine on a 1GBit/s interface
could not report a valid attack with a strength of 5 GBit/s) to
the FCC. Upon shutdown, it deregisters with the FCC.
The Function Chaining Controller runs in a centralized
location reachable from all security functions. A webpage
showing attack statistics and the current and standard configu-
ration is part of the FCC. Additionally, the webpage contains
a form to change the routing configuration manually based on
the available groups of security functions. The controller needs
to handle the requests from the wrapper instance, namely regis-
tration, delete requests, attack alerts, and keep-alive requests,
as shown before. The FCC must keep a list of the security
function groups and their respective attack rate to calculate the
new optimal routing configuration reactively. After calculating
the new routing configuration, the FCC sends it to the SDN
controller, which then applies it to the switches and, therefore,
the network. In this section, we use a simplified approach
putting the security function group with the most attacks at the
front. After successfully changing the routing configuration,
the FCC changes the stored current configuration to the new
routing configuration and resets the reported attacks.
B. Evaluation
1) Implementation and Evaluation Environment: The com-
plete framework uses Python 3 with four non-standard Python
libraries: Flask, PyJWT, requests, and netifaces. In general,
this framework supports every SDN controller offering a Rep-
resentational State Transfer (REST) API for flow modification.
To ensure the absence of side effects from the SDN controller,
we implemented a minimalistic SDN controller ourselves. For
this PoC evaluation and the following evaluation, we limit our
framework to use Open vSwitch only. This SDN Controller
consists of two Flask applications: the actual controller and a
switch wrapper running on the Open vSwitch machines.
We use a testbed environment similar to the one presented
before for the SSFC order evaluation. However, we replace
the physical switches with Open vSwitch instances.
2) Manual Reordering: At first, we evaluate that our system
is able to correctly apply reordering decisions.
a) Experiment Description: We test all six SSFC orders
possible for the three security functions. Therefore, we auto-
mated the process to test these routing configurations in the
network based on the standard configuration. After starting the
system and registering the security functions, the client sends
an ICMP echo-request to the server. Next, we started tcpdump
on each security function logging the traffic. From these logs,
we construct the path, a packet takes through the network.
b) Results: The results show that our framework applies
every permutation of the default configuration correctly. When
reordering, it is possible to traverse through more security
functions than there are in the network. This issue is a result of
changing the routing configuration while traffic passes through
the system. The following packets go through the desired
function chain. Although packet loss is theoretically possible,
the new routing configurations are applied instantly for the
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retransmissions. Also, while theoretically possible, no attack
completely skipped a security function.
3) Reaction to Simulated Attacks: Next, we analyze how
the system reacts to simulated attacks.
a) Experiment Description: This experiment validates
whether the FCC correctly changes the routing configuration
based on the attacks reported by the security functions. The
main idea that led to the development of the framework is
to change the routing configuration dynamically. As described
before, the security functions report detected attacks via the
co-located security function wrapper instance to the FCC. We
simulate attacks on each VM, to show that the attack reporting
works and the routing configuration changes depending on
the attack reports. The simulated security functions send
attack reports with a changing probabilities. We configured
a threshold of 100 attacks in the FCC. Only if the attack
count exceeds this threshold, the FCC calculates and — if
necessary — applies a new routing configuration. Additionally,
we define an imminent threshold three times larger than the
regular threshold checked every ten seconds.
b) Experiment Results: Figure 8 illustrates the imminent
attack functionality. The first modification of the routing
configuration occurs at almost three minutes into the exper-
iment. The SSFC order changes from DPS-Firewall-IDPS to
Firewall-IDPS-DPS. This change could not originate from the
regular check as it occurs before the five-minute mark.
A further change proves the regular functionality of the
FCC. The routing configuration takes effect approximately
12 minutes after the start of the experiment. The SSFC
order changes from Firewall-IDPS-DPS to IDPS-Firewall-
DPS. Here, it becomes visible that for one ping, the packets
did not traverse every security function, posing a potential
security risk.
Further reorderings work as desired. The FCC resets the
configuration to the standard configuration if reported attacks
of all security functions are below the configured threshold.
This reset to default allows users to select a default configu-
ration that best fits the average attack on the system.
4) Discussion:
a) Functionality: In summary, the developed framework
is working as expected. Small issues like packet loss may
occur during the application of new routing configurations.
The generation of routes and their application works as de-
sired. We also showed that the framework is indeed attack-
aware and successfully changes the routing configuration of
the network based on the reported attacks from the security
functions. After attacks fade out, the framework then switches
back to the default configuration.
b) Security Issues During Reconfiguration: Three unde-
sired scenarios can occur during reconfiguration: i) packets get
dropped because the framework has not installed the required
flow yet, ii) packets traverse through more than once through
one or more security functions, and iii) packets do not traverse
through all required security functions.
The first and second issues pose only Quality of Service
and Quality of Experience concerns. However, the third issue
is relevant to security. If packets can skip security functions,
single malicious packets can reach the receiver. This issue is
of little concern for flood attacks, but for intrusions, a single
packet might be enough to trigger a vulnerability and cause a
severe security breach.
To avoid this issue, we propose several solutions: i) A
second set of security functions. Reconfigurations would then
use this second set for the SSFC. Once all packets clear the
security functions in the first chain, those functions become
the spare functions for the next reconfiguration. ii) To model
the stay of packets inside the security function, by adding
short-lived flows with artificial delays that ensure, that no
packets are inside the functions when executing the reordering.
However, this requires detailed knowledge of all security
functions inside the chain, especially regarding their queuing
behavior. iii) To force the security functions to drop all packets
before executing the reordering. This solution fixes the second
and third problems but moves the affected packets and others
to the first issue. iv) To use the options field in the Internet
Protocol (IP) header. We create a counter field in the options
and increment it for every reconfiguration. The inbound switch
has a rule that modifies incoming packet headers to contain
the current counter value, and all created flows match against
the current counter. Older flows expire after some time.
Depending on the use-case, there are different optimal
solutions for the security system architecture. We have not
yet implemented these solutions but will do so in the future.
For the PoC, the presented implementation is sufficient.
VI. MODELING SECURITY FUNCTION CHAINS
Here, we will develop a precise model. First, we take a
look at how to model a single security function based on the
incoming traffic. We then use this knowledge and combine
multiple security function models into a single SSFC model.
A. Modeling Single Security Functions
1) Modeling Traffic: Different security functions show a
different behavior under different types of traffic. Thus, we
need a model that takes both benign traffic and the various
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Fig. 9: Exemplary development of the traffic composition over the course of a security service function chain.
attack types into account. To this end, our model of the arrival
rate must consider the content and the composition of the
traffic. Therefore, we model the traffic as different workload
classes. For every workload class, we record the rate of packets
and the used bandwidth. We model the traffic composition for
the link from an external network to the first security function,
every connection between security functions, and the link from
the last security function to the protected system.
2) Security Function Modeling: With a model for the
traffic, it is possible to model the behavior of the single
security functions. We propose to apply architectural per-
formance models to model security functions. Architectural
models capture the semantics, allowing for a plain view
on the security functions, in contrast to low-level stochastic
formalisms. We model each security function as a software
component. However, we also offer simplified approaches
to model security functions. It is necessary to model three
aspects: i) the effect of the security functions on the traffic
composition, ii) the performance behavior of the security
function, and iii) tertiary effects like packet-loss.
Based on the distribution of the input traffic of a security
appliance, the corresponding output traffic can be derived. We
define the distribution of the input/output traffic as Pin/out(ti)
with i ∈ [1, n] for n different types of traffic.
Exemplary, for a security function which drops all packets
of the traffic type k the output traffic looks as follows:
Pout(ti) =
{
Pin(ti)/(1− Pin(tk)) for i 6= k
0 for i = k
. (1)
The current model assumes that a function eliminates all
malicious traffic of one or more traffic types.
For performance modeling, the most precise modeling so-
lution would be to use a full-blown model of the software
component to model the function’s performance behavior.
Such models usually base on the functions source code or are
extracted by heavy black-box testing. However, often neither
the source code nor the resources are available to perform
extensive black-box testing. Still, even when such a model
is not possible, for our security functions, we have found two
general types of resource demand generation. The first type is a
constant demand created per unit (e.g., frame, packet, segment,
request). The second type creates a demand correlating to the
size of the unit with different correlation types.
There are tertiary factors that can increase the accuracy of
the model in certain situations. These factors do not correlate
directly with single packets or the traffic distribution but
instead with the state of the security. Examples are Queuing
Behavior, False Positives and False Negatives, Drop Rate,
Overload Behavior, and Short Term CPU Frequency Scaling.
B. Modeling Security Service Function Chains
Based on the model for single security functions, it is
possible to model the whole security function chain. Therefore,
we model the chain by putting the functions one after the other
and feeding the output of the previous function to the next.
When starting with the input traffic, the traffic results from
putting it through one function after the other. Figure 9 shows
such a development of the traffic for the function described
above. Therefore, we use a simplified model without tertiary
factors. The traffic starts with a distribution over all traffic
types. At every security function, this function removes one
or more traffic classes. Thereby the share of the other classes
increases. This process repeats itself at every security function
until only the benign traffic remains. This combination allows
a full model of the chain when knowing the composition at
the startup. However, most of the time, this composition is
unknown. Still, it is possible to reverse engineer this compo-
sition using the reports from the security function wrappers
and the switches in the framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the concept of attack-aware
dynamic Security Service Function Chain reordering. This
concept incorporates changing the order of SSFCs to optimize
them to most efficiently counter attacks. At first, we described
the general idea. The main component is the Function Chain-
ing Controller (FCC). It gathers information to model the
security systems state, uses this information to compute the
desired configuration, and enforces the SSFC order. Next, we
developed an evaluation environment for individual security
functions and SSFCs. When benchmarking single security
functions, we found different types of behavior. For every
tested combination, the SSFC order has a significant impact
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on the system’s performance. In general, putting the function
that defends against the attack first, yields better performance.
The difference can make up two or more SSFC orders of
magnitude. For different attacks, we found SSFC orders that
contradicted each other. Thus, there is no SSFC order that is
optimal for every attack.
Next, we have designed a framework that performs attack-
aware dynamic SSFC reordering. All security functions reside
inside an SDN-enabled network. A security function wrapper
co-located with every security function reports attacks at
these functions via a separate management network to the
FCC. The FCC computes the desired SSFC order for the
security functions and submits it to the SDN controller, which
enforces it by creating the necessary flows on the SDN
switches. We developed a PoC implementation and show that
the framework can enforce all possible SSFC orders. The
framework successfully adapted to all attacks and, after the
attacks ceased, successfully restored the default configuration.
Thus this proved the desired functionality. An issue occurs
when reordering, packets can drop or pass through a function
twice. We proposed four options to combat this issue for
different use-cases.
We model the traffic categorizing it into traffic classes,
where benign traffic and every attack type each forms a
class. Every security function affects the traffic as a function
depending on the traffic composition. The model for an SSFC
consists of multiple security function models. Traffic that exits
one function continues to the next. Thereby, it is possible to
compute the total resource demand.
The work on dynamic SSFC reordering is far from finished.
In the future, we plan to evaluate our modeling and test it with
various decision-making approaches. We also plan to extend
the framework to allow different orders for different traffic
types and evaluate its impact on energy consumption.
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